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Introduction
Syria is historically and geographically ill-defined, although an identifi-
able Syrian ethnicity can be traced to the Biblical era. Nonetheless, the 
contemporary Syrian state deems Lebanon little more than an errant Syr-
ian province, albeit one that has been at the economic heart of Syria since 
Ottoman times.1 Syria's political objectives are to maintain authority over 
the Lebanese state and to manipulate both Hizbollah ("Party of God") and 
the larger Lebanese polity to Syrian advantage. On the other hand, Iran—
with an historic connection to the Shi'a of Lebanon—seeks ostensibly to 
further the Shi'a Islamist revolution. Iran and Syria mutually desire to use 
Lebanon and Hizbollah as an asset in their own confrontations with 
Israel.
Beginning with the outbreak of Lebanon's civil war in 1975, Syria worked 
to penetrate and influence terrorist organizations and militias operating 
in Lebanon with the aim of furthering Syria's political domination. Syria 
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has been unsuccessful in its efforts to penetrate and control Hizbollah, 
due—in part—to Iran's interests in the Shi'a inhabitants of Lebanon. The 
modus vivendi (understanding) that finally emerged was one of Syrian 
tolerance for Hizbollah's relative independence in return for Hizbollah's 
facilitation of larger Syrian interests regarding Lebanon and Israel.
Syria's support of Hizbollah is an element of the marriage of convenience 
that characterizes the larger Iranian-Syrian entente. The changing nature 
of Iran's relationship with Syria mirrors, to a certain extent, the relation-
ship between Hizbollah's security apparatus and Syrian intelligence. The 
genuine alliance between Hizbollah and Iran can be juxtaposed against 
Syria's desire to control Hizbollah activity in Lebanon. Essentially, Syria 
tolerates and supports Hizbollah's activities in Lebanon because Hizbol-
lah furthers Syria's political and policy objectives. Syria's ability to attenu-
ate the arms flow to Hizbollah is its primary source of influence. That 
influence is limited, however, by Damascus's need to maintain good rela-
tions with Tehran.
Syrian backing for Hizbollah operations has been characterized by a 
punctuated rhythm in the decades following Hizbollah's establishment. 
Syrian support was greatest between the Iranian creation of Hizbollah in 
July of 1982 through the Hizbollah operations aimed at driving the Multi-
national Forces out of Lebanon two years later. Following the withdrawal 
of Multinational Forces in 1984, Syria attenuated its support for Hizbol-
lah operations as it altered its intentions regarding Israel and Lebanon.
When Syria wants to intimidate non-Shi'a Lebanese or Israel, it provides 
greater support for Hizbollah operations. Once those objectives are 
achieved, Syria reduces its support for Hizbollah. When Syrian assistance 
to Hizbollah is otherwise minimal, it nonetheless facilitates logistical sup-
port, in part, to maintain good relations with Tehran. The current Adra 
facility near Damascus, for example, is a case in point. It is within Syrian 
borders but acts as a Hizbollah arms depot and trans-shipment point, as 
well as a Hizbollah training facility. Syria's physical control of the facility 
allows it to attenuate the arms flow to Hizbollah in Lebanon. This nomi-
nal control, however, is undermined by the fact that the arms are financed 
by Tehran. Therefore, Damascus's ability to exercise its authority over the 
facility and Hizbollah is truncated, lest it incur Tehran's wrath.
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The Foundational Syrian Intelligence Apparatus and 
Its Operations in Lebanon
While Syria managed to subsume its clan, tribal, and religious divisions 
under an authoritarian and secular Ba'athist state by the 1960s,2 these 
factional loyalties continue to persist in its intelligence services.3 Syrian 
intelligence originated during the French Mandate (1923–1943) and was 
referred to as the Deuxième Bureau until 1969.4 The modern Syrian intel-
ligence services emerged in the 1970s under (then) Soviet tutelage. They 
still reflect Soviet influence, albeit in a particularly Syrian political and 
cultural context. The historic heart of Syria's praetorian state during the 
regime of Hafez Assad (1971–2000) was a balanced triumvirate consist-
ing of the General Intelligence Directorate (Idarat al-Amn al-'Amm), Gen-
eral Military Intelligence (Shu'bat al-Mukhabarat al-'Askariyya), and Air 
Force Intelligence (Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Jawiyya).5 Air Force Intelli-
gence is the smallest intelligence organ, but its role is significant in liais-
ing with Syrian-sponsored terrorist organizations.6
Syria's foundational intelligence agencies are supported by derivative 
agencies in a security network whose primary imperative is the protection 
of Assad's (both Hafez's and Bashar's) regime. The primary external focus 
of Syrian intelligence is on the polities of Lebanon. During the last quarter 
of the twentieth century in Lebanon, Syria pioneered and perfected the 
operational use of state-sponsored terrorism as a covert tool of state pol-
icy.7 Elements of Syrian Military and Air Force Intelligence, in their early 
institutional iterations, created regularized procedures whereby Dam-
ascus would approve political targets and task a terrorist group operating 
in Lebanon, but dominated by Syria (such as the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine General Command [PFLP-GC]) as external assets. 
The PFLP-GC, in this example, would then carry out the operational par-
ticulars with Syrian intelligence support, thereby insulating the Syrian 
government from direct culpability.8
The ability of Syrian intelligence organs to infiltrate organizations in Leb-
anon is facilitated by a border that is somewhat ambiguous because of the 
reluctance of Damascus to completely demarcate the boundary or recog-
nize Lebanese sovereignty.9 In essence, the border is merely an adminis-
trative division between eastern Lebanon and Syria proper, although 
there are two major recognized crossing points: at Jusia between Baalbek, 
Lebanon and Homs, Syria; and at Masnaa on the Beirut-to-Damascus 
highway. Several dozen additional informal crossing points are used pri-
marily by smugglers.10 Individual Syrian officers administering the post-
1976 occupation of Lebanon were often primarily concerned with per-
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sonal enrichment, and only secondarily concerned with either Syria's Leb-
anese interests or the confrontation with Israel.11 Syrian occupation 
authorities operated what amounted to a tax-farming system in the Bekka 
and allowed narcotics production to surge from regional to global signifi-
cance while funneling hundreds of millions of dollars into the larger Syr-
ian economy.12 In addition to profiting from other kinds of criminal 
activity, Syria used Lebanese front men and Lebanese banks to launder 
money procured from corruption, and to facilitate particular terrorist 
operations.13 Since the nominal Syrian state lacked a private banking sys-
tem, Damascus was quite dependent on the Lebanese banks for both nor-
mal economic transactions and for more nefarious Syrian activities.
Lebanese Militias as Syrian Instruments
The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) was founded in Beirut and has 
traditionally maintained a substantial presence in Lebanon, along with 
several large, although factionalized, militias wholly beholden to Dam-
ascus. The Bath'ist foreign policy of modern Syria effectively incorporated 
part of the pan-Syrian ideology expressed decades earlier by the SSNP, 
arguing that geographic Syria should include present-day Israel/Pales-
tine, Lebanon, and Jordan.14 The SSNP's significant links to many of the 
region's political radicals facilitated enhanced operational flexibility of 
Syrian intelligence interactions with terrorist organizations in Lebanon.15 
The ability of Syrian intelligence to access the SSNP provided Syria's 
organs with an additional entrée into some of the major Palestinian mili-
tias, which Syria sought to infiltrate in order to bolster the Syrian intelli-
gence apparatus.
Syria has used the SSNP as a level to manipulate various factions and 
militias in Lebanon, including Lebanon's Shi'a community. In 1986, for 
example, Hafez Assad deployed the SSNP militias to rein in Hizbollah, 
lest it threaten the continued viability of Shi'a Lebanese Resistance 
Detachments (aka Amal al-Islamiyah, or AMAL, which also means 
"hope" in Arabic), and thereby degrade Syrian influence over the Shi'a 
population.16 Hizbollah's ability to extend its wasta, or influence, deep 
into the Shi'a clans was in direct competition with Syria's effort to domi-
nate the larger Lebanese polity. Assad used the SSNP to enhance his 
authority in Lebanon, while avoiding a direct confrontation with Iran that 
might have ensued had Syrian troops confronted Hizbollah directly. Syria 
and Iran then negotiated a cease-fire and modus vivendi between AMAL 
and Hizbollah, easing tensions until the T'iaf agreement ended the larger 
civil war in 1989. Syria also desired access to the Palestinian camps, 
whose extraterritoriality established by the Cairo Agreement was an 
intrinsic affront to the authority of Damascus.17 In addition to the SSNP, 
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organizations like the PFLP-GC furthered Syrian infiltration efforts. 
Although long beholden to Syrian intelligence, the PFLP-GC nevertheless 
shed its Marxist pretenses and embraced both Iran and Syria when 
Tehran began to fund the organization.18 The result was a PFLP-GC with 
some factions beholden to Iran and others more subservient to Dam-
ascus. The PFLP-GC became a Syrian tool, particularly in the Borj Al-
Baraineh camp in southern Beirut, while other PFLP-GC factions cooper-
ated with Iranian intelligence.
Syrian influence in the Hizbollah-dominated Bekka was enhanced 
through the presence of Syrian personnel in PFLP-GC facilities in Taala-
baya, Koussaya (near Zahleh), and in the western Bekka area of Kamed 
Al-Lawz. Assad likewise used what was originally an Iraqi Shi'a Islamist 
Dawah organization to further its influence among Lebanon's Shi'a. Cre-
ated by Baqr al-Sadr (a cousin of Musa Sadr) in 1958, Lebanon's al-
Dawah (the Islamic Call) was formed in the late 1960s and officially dis-
solved itself in 1980 in response to Khomeini's admonitions concerning 
Western-style party organization. There was little practical consequence, 
as al-Dawah's members were subsumed into the larger Hizbollah move-
ment. Those Dawah affiliates retaining less formal adherence to Dawah 
ideology tended to follow Hussein Fadlallah. They became almost com-
pletely infiltrated by Syrian intelligence by the late 1990s, although they 
continued training at Hizbollah camps until they created their own facili-
ties in 1996.19 Additionally, Syria exercised its influence through compro-
mised organizations. In so doing, it gained an independent modality with 
which to enforce its authority over recalcitrant Lebanese players through 
an autonomously operated system of detention centers in Beirut and Tri-
poli; in the Bekka towns of Anjar and Chtaura; and in prisons located at 
Palmyra and Mezza (in Damascus).
Iran's Sway with Lebanon's Hizbollah
A cosmopolitan Lebanese state created under French auspices was 
intended to protect Maronite co-religionists. Paris carved a Christian-
Arab state out of greater Syria in the environs of Mt. Lebanon.20 This 
Christian-dominated Lebanon was forged with a confessional system 
controlled by a Maronite-Sunni axis to the disadvantage of Lebanon's 
Shi'a.21 Lebanon's Shi'a, historically affiliated with the Twelver Shi'a of 
Iran, was relegated to third-class citizenship in their own country. The 
confessional system stratified Lebanese political institutions and civil 
society in ways that became increasingly untenable over time, ultimately 
leading to civil war and Syrian intervention. This was followed by two 
Israeli invasions aimed at settling accounts with the Palestinians. The 
Wege: Hizbollah–Syrian Intelligence Affairs: A Marriage of Convenience
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Journal of Strategic Security
6
initial Israeli invasion is noteworthy for the establishment of an Israeli-
occupied "security zone" roughly fifteen kilometers deep along Lebanon's 
southern border. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in a more substantive 
way, intent on liquidating the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
infrastructure in Lebanon. While the Shi'a of Lebanon's southern region 
were in regular conflict with the Palestinians, the Israelis clashed with the 
Shi'a as well, precipitating Iranian intervention. Among the Shi'a, the 
1982 Israel-Lebanon war catalyzed the emergence of Islamic AMAL and 
its coalition with the followers of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli and other Shi'a 
factions in Lebanon's Bekka Valley.22 The Sepahe al-Quds (Jerusalem) 
elements of Iran's Pasdaran (Padan-e Inqilal-e Islami, or Revolutionary 
Guards), in coordination with the Iranian Embassies in Beirut and 
Damascus, deployed in eastern Bekka in July 1982.23 The Sepahe al-Quds 
built on this AMAL coalition and, thus Hizbollah was born.24
The first iteration of Hizbollah included a security apparatus modeled on 
the AMAL security service and, more generally, Fatah's Jihaz al-Razd.25 
Hizbollah's initial operations were consummated using multiple organi-
zational descriptors for this security apparatus.26 Hussein al-Khalil first 
established Hizbollah's security apparatus in the Bekka during the sum-
mer of 1982, coordinating operations with AMAL before being formally 
subordinated to Hizbollah under Hussein Musawi after 1984.27 The core 
Hizbollah security apparatus functions were configured and nurtured by 
elements of the Bekka's Pasdaran Quds.28 Hizbollah's initial creation in 
the summer of 1982 under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
auspices resulted in necessarily limited operations aimed at the coales-
cence of Hizbollah's constituent entities.
The first military efforts carried out with these proto-Hizbollah fighters 
were limited and intended primarily to gain control of territory in the 
Bekka Valley. These coalescing Hizbollah fighters were primarily opposed 
by scattered AMAL fighters and minor Bekka militias associated with 
existing clans.29 The Israeli focus on the Palestinians was so intense that 
they missed the significance of the "Party of God." These early Hizbollah 
operations were organized with fighters drawn primarily from the 
Hamadi and Musawi clans, using various organizational names. Between 
1983 and about 1985, Sheikh al-Musawi became operational head of the 
emergent security apparatus, with the Musawi and Hamadi clans remain-
ing as core clans of the embryonic Hizbollah organization.30
Hizbollah's security apparatus, as it developed, reflected the configura-
tion, almost in a geographic sense, of the principal Shi'a clans in each of 
Lebanon's three distinct regions of Shi'a dominance, although the 
regional organizations in the middle-1980s included elements of other 
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clan-based criminal networks.31 The geographic regions themselves were 
subdivided into sectors, creating a compartmentalized operational envi-
ronment. Hizbollah developed multiple and overlapping security organs 
derived from the original security apparatus. These subsidiary organs had 
primary responsibility for maintaining Hizbollah's organizational integ-
rity as the militia developed with changing security needs and relation-
ships. Hizbollah's operational security arm is strictly separated from the 
organization's political and military wings. That separation is more com-
plete than the separation between most state political institutions and 
security services. Consequently, Hizbollah's political wing's ability to 
exercise administrative control over the military wing and its security 
organs has always been problematic.
At the end of Lebanon's civil war in 1989, Hizbollah created a dual policy 
in Lebanon. Hizbollah's military wing, the Islamic Resistance, continued 
operations aimed at the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and pro-
vided armed protection for the Shi'a community in Lebanon. The logisti-
cal support for Hizbollah's Islamic Resistance was provided by Iran and 
facilitated through Syria. In the second track, Hizbollah entered Lebanese 
parliamentary politics, abiding by the political norms established with the 
1989 Peace of Ti'af.32 Lebanese political stability increased, resulting in 
an evolution of Hizbollah's security apparatus to include security func-
tions supporting the organization's social, political, and military opera-
tions. With Hizbollah's emergence as a political party representing the 
bulk of Lebanon's Shi'a, the security apparatus accrued some functions 
analogous to an Interior Ministry's.33 Police functions became necessary 
to maintain both the integrity of the party and Lebanon's Shi'a body poli-
tic in territories controlled by Hizbollah.
In the 1990s, local military operations focused on Israel and its occupa-
tion zone in the south. The security apparatus managed overall coordina-
tion and maintained organizational integrity, enhancing guerrilla 
resistance until the Israelis were driven out in 2000.34 Syria maintained 
an intelligence presence in every major Lebanese city, including a sub-
stantial one in the Ramlet al-Baida district of Beirut.35 Kan'an's replace-
ment as head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, General Rustom 
Ghazaleh, maintained a headquarters staff of about 100 Syrian military 
intelligence personnel in the small eastern Bekka village of Anjar prior to 
Syria's formal withdrawal of troops in 2005.
After the Syrian withdrawal in 2005, Hizbollah adopted a new approach 
much more conducive to orderly governance which included giving tacit 
approval for the Lebanese army to act against criminal gangs in Brital 
(which had become a car-theft capital) and in the Hizbollah stronghold at 
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Baalbek.36 The security apparatus thereby separated traditional police 
functions from roles supporting military and covert operations. Following 
the summer war in 2006, Hizbollah's role shifted more to one of deterring 
Israeli incursion rather than resisting Israeli occupation. The incorpora-
tion of Hizbollah into the Lebanese polity as a formal partner in Leba-
non's government, with ministerial responsibilities, concomitantly made 
it a greater target for Syrian manipulation as Damascus sought to main-
tain control over the Lebanese state.
Iran and the Narrow Hizbollah-Syrian Entente
Syria's troop withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 was effectively reversed 
because of the efforts of the former head of Syrian Military intelligence, 
General Asif Shawkat, who was promoted to deputy chief of staff of the 
armed forces in 2010. Yet Hizbollah's liaison with the Syrians was more 
problematic than with Iran's Quds force and the Ministry of Intelligence 
and Security (MOIS).37 Former Syrian President Hafez Assad facilitated 
Pasdaran operations in the Bekka to immunize his troops in Lebanon 
against Shi'a militants.38 This was important, with Assad supporting both 
the Shi'a AMAL and the Shiite Hizbollah, even given the greater Alawite 
affinity for the secularists of AMAL.39 The small Alawite community in 
Lebanon was concentrated in Tripoli and Akkar in the north, and histori-
cally its members joined secular militias and parties, including Lebanon's 
Ba'ath and Lebanese Community Party.
The major developments in the region since the summer war of 2006 
have been the increasing role of Hizbollah in Syrian military doctrine and 
the growing integration of Iran and Hizbollah into the Syrian command 
and control apparatus. Hizbollah, while maintaining some features from 
its origins as a liberation organization, has developed many characteris-
tics of traditional military organizations. Iran has facilitated this develop-
ment, supporting the creation of several brigade-style organizations, as 
well as providing advanced infantry weapons and shoulder-fired surface-
to-air missiles. Post-war Iranian logistical support has resulted in a 
Hizbollah rocket arsenal nearly three times its size prior to the summer 
war, with a larger fraction of those rockets capable of carrying a more sub-
stantial payload with much more precise targeting. The number and qual-
ity of these rockets, and increasing confidence in Hizbollah's ability to use 
them effectively, are acting as significant deterrents against an Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon.
Hizbollah is also playing an operational role in the integration of some 
channels of the joint Iranian-Syrian command apparatus.40 Syria and 
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Iran maintain a common interest in monitoring events in Lebanon and 
Israel. Consequently, an important element of the joint command appara-
tus has been the construction of electronic listening posts. Syria and Iran 
agreed to build four such signals intelligence stations and constructed 
them in the Golan Heights, the Al-Jazirah and Bab Al-Hawa' regions in 
northern Syria, and the Abu Kamal region of northeastern Syria.41
While it would be a vast overstatement to imply that the Syrian and Ira-
nian military commands are wholly integrated, it is nonetheless appropri-
ate to acknowledge a significant level of cooperation in Lebanon and in 
confrontations with Israel in that theater.42 Hizbollah's most notable role 
in this integration has been in expanding the scope of communication and 
signals intelligence. That scope ranges from support functions, such as 
guarding approaches to the Mt. Sannine and Mt. Barukh radar stations 
operated by Syria and Iran, to integrating Iranian intelligence personnel 
into Hizbollah operational command posts that engage Israeli military 
communications (as occurred during the 2006 summer war).
Conclusions
Syrian practice, since the beginning of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, has 
been to infiltrate and manipulate terrorist organizations and militias of all 
political stripes with the objective of turning them into Syrian assets. Such 
assets further Syrian policy in its ongoing confrontation with Israel. Syria 
has been unable however, to turn Hizbollah into a wholly owned asset, 
due to both the Shi'a religious élan and the protection provided to Hizbol-
lah by its alliance with Iran. Hizbollah has evolved into a component of 
the Lebanese state, facilitating both Syrian and Iranian objectives while at 
the same time maintaining its autonomy. The modus vivendi is Syria's 
tolerance for Hizbollah independence and some Iranian role in Lebanon 
in return for Hizbollah support of larger Syrian interests regarding Leba-
non and Israel.
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